Section 7 of Chapter 40A contains a statute of limitations for actions by individuals and municipalities to compel the removal, alteration, or relocation of any structure due to a zoning violation.  In Bruno v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Tisbury, the Appeals Court considered when the statute of limitations commences based on a zoning violation arising from an ANR (Approval Not Required) subdivision of land.

The Goethals owned a large lot with a single family home and guesthouse.  In 2001, the local planning board endorsed the Goethals’ plan to subdivide that lot into two parcels and, for a time, the Goethals retained both Lots.   Their guesthouse was on Lot 1 and a single family home was on Lot 2.  Lot 1 is about 12,000 square feet, whereas zoning requires a minimum lot size of 25,000 square feet for a single family home.


Continue Reading

For three years we’ve been following the saga of 81 Spooner Road, the Brookline property at the center of a contentious zoning dispute and, more recently, an arson investigation.  See our original post here, and our follow-ups here, here and here.  Now, a trio of Northeastern University journalism students under the supervision of their professor – former Boston

In a decision that re-affirms its 2001 ruling in Preston v. Board of Appeals of Hull, the Appeals Court last week held that the grandfathered status of a lawful pre-existing nonconforming lot is not perpetual, and can be lost if the lot later comes into common ownership with adjoining land.  In such circumstances, the adjoining lots merge to the extent necessary to

Doctor.JPGWhile many legal doctrines have poetic names (ancient lights, fruit of the poisonous tree), few are as vivid as “infectious invalidity.”  At its simplest, this land use doctrine holds that an owner of an existing lot that is legally non-conforming with zoning (say, because it doesn’t meet increased lot area requirements) who also owns adjoining land cannot lawfully create a new, fully-conforming parcel without first “curing” the non-conformity by using some of the adjoining land.  If there is not enough “extra” land to cure the non-conformity, the new lot is deemed “infected” – and non-buildable – even if it ostensibly conforms with all current requirements.  Unfortunately, new and apparently conforming lots are sometimes created in this manner and then conveyed, leaving the unwitting buyer with a non-conforming lot and the seller unjustly enriched.

In its recent decision in 81 Spooner Road, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline (pdf), the Appeals Court addressed infectious invalidity in the context of floor-area-ratio requirements for single-family homes.  In doing so, it also made an important point about standing.

In Spooner Road, the eponymous parcel was a residential lot with a single-family home in the Town of Brookline.  Under the town’s zoning bylaw, the maximum floor-area ratio (FAR) for single-family homes – the ratio of a home’s floor area to the size of the lot – is .30.  The existing house on the existing lot easily met that ratio.  The plaintiff LLC divided the lot in two and, in a twist on the typical infectious invalidity scenario, kept the newly-created lot for itself and sold the remaining, now-smaller lot with the house on it to a third party.  The new lot ostensibly met all zoning requirements.  The remaining house lot, however, was now too small to meet the FAR limit.  Neighbors, the Foggs, challenged the LLC’s building permit for the new lot, and the Brookline zoning board of appeals revoked the permit.  The Land Court affirmed the board’s decision based on infectious invalidity, and the LLC appealed.

The Appeals Court first addressed the Foggs’ standing.  Under Massachusetts law, the Foggs as abutters had a presumption of standing that the LLC could rebut with affirmative evidence, shifting the burden to the Foggs to present affirmative evidence of sufficient harm to confer standing.  The LLC claimed that it had rebutted the Foggs’ presumption of standing, but the Appeals Court disagreed.  The court found that the LLC’s effort to rebut the Foggs standing, which consisted of pointing to Mr. Fogg’s deposition testimony in which he offered his own unsupported opinion of his harm, was not the type of affirmative evidence necessary to rebut the presumption.  In the words of the court, the “LLC cannot claim shelter under this rule and cause the burden to shift to George Fogg, simply by offering his opinion testimony and by drawing speculative conclusions from that testimony.”


Continue Reading